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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
such adjudication is made, the breach must be related back to the time of
the filing of the petition. In re Portage Rubber Co., supra; In re Swift,
supra. Despite the above authorities, the apparent weight of authority is
that involuntary as well as voluntary bankruptcy constitutes an anticipatory
breach giving rise to provable claims on the ground that bankruptcy proceedings, however instituted, are but the natural and legal consequence of
something done or omitted to be done by the bankrupt in violation of his
implied engagement to maintain ability to perform. Central Trust Co. v.
Chicago Auditorium, supra; Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City R. Co., 198 F.
721; Heyward v. Goldsmith, 269 F. 946; Re Swift, 112 F. 315; Re Stern,
116 F. 604; Re Pettingill, supra. It is submitted that the privilege of the
trustees to assume the contract, if they so desire, cannot be reconciled with
the theory that bankruptcy, whether involuntary or voluntary, is a breach
of the contract, since on sound principle the trustees can have no greater
rights than the bankrupt, and if there has been repudiation or material
breach, it seems impossible to deny the solvent party the right to refuse
to proceed with the contract even though the trustee in bankruptcy subsequently desires to adopt it. Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1327.
K. J. M.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACTs

OF AGENT-Plaintiff recovered a judgment on a note and a foreclosure of a
mortgage, and defendant appealed. Defendant executed the note and
mortgage to defendant and delivered them to one E., the agent of the
bank. E had authority to secure and conduct business with foreigners for
the bank. The occasion for the execution of the note and mortgage was
the promise of E to procure a bond which would enable defendant to release his brother who was held by immigration authorities. E had no
authority to do this. E later introduced defendant to the officers of the
plaintiff bank, who promised to advance him the money on good security.
The mortgage and note were executed, and a check was given to E to give
to defendant. E absconded with the money. HELD: judgment reversed.
The agency did not end when defendant was introduced to the officers of
the bank, and E was acting in the course of his employment when he
absconded. Kostoff et ux. v. Meyer-Kiser Bank, Supreme Court of Indiana,
August 13, 1929, 167 N. E. 527.
A bank is liable for acts of the agent when acting in the apparent
scope of his authority even though the acts are fraudulent; and where a
principal authorizes an act by his agent, he is bound by the acts and
representations of the agent while doing that act. Day v. Dages, 17 Ind.
App. 228; First National Bank v. Josefoff, 57 Ind. App. 320; Wolfe v.
Pugh, 101 Ind. 293.
If the agent has ostensible authority to do an act, he is presumed to
have such authority unless the contrary is shown and if it is in the apparent course of his employment. Hawkins v. Fourth National Bank, 150
Ind. 117.
Where a bank holds out even a minor official as being intrusted with
certain powers and duties, his acts within the scope of such apparent
authority are binding on the bank. Fort Worth etc. Bank v. Martin, 8
S. W. 507; Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35; 7 C. J. 559.

RECENT CASE NOTES
A bank can not take the benefits of an agency and not be bound by the
agent's acts and representations in securing the benefits. Munn v. Burch,
supra.
The case is undoubtedly sound and in accord with the modern tendency
of courts to consider that every agency is so far general that it must
cover, not only the precise thing to be done, but whatever usually and
R. C. H.
rationally belongs to the doing of it.
WILLS-SIGNATURE IN SUPERSCRIPTION-INTENTION TO ADOPT NAME AS
SIGNATURE--Six weeks before her death Mrs. Belle Stockman, in her own
handwriting, prepared a paper which purported to be her last will. On
the day of her death she requested a nurse to bring the paper to her, saying that it was her will, and desiring the nurse and another person present
to sign it as witnesses, which they did. Mrs. Stockman did not subscribe
her name, and it appeared only in the superscription, thus: "The will of
Belle Stockman." Appellees contest the probate of the will on the ground
that it was not signed as required by statute. HELD: a judgment for appellees, refusing probate, is reversed. Thrift Trust Co. v. White et al,
Appellate Court of Indiana, June 25, 1929, 167 N. E. 141. (Petition for rehearing denied Oct. 22, 1929.)
The statute provides that: "No will ...... shall affect an estate unless it be
in writing, signed by the testator, or someone in his presence with his
consent, and attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more competent witnesses." 2 Rev. St. 1852, p. 308; section 3452, Burns' 1926. The
question as to whether the testator's name in his own handwriting, appearing at the beginning of the will, is a sufficient signing under the statute,
is one of first impression in this state, although it long has been decided
in many jurisdictions.
After the statute of frauds, the signature of the testator became necessary; its position on the instrument, however, was immaterial. Lemayne
v. Stanley (1681) 83 Eng. Reprint 545. In this case, the testator -wrote his
own will: "In the name of God, amen, I, John Stanley, make this my last
will and testament." The name did not appear elsewhere on the wil), but
the court held it to be a sufficient signing. The Indiana statute, like the
English statute of frauds, does not specify where the testator's signature
should appear on the will. Other states with statutes similar to the one
in force in this state generally have followed the Lemayne Case. The
Supreme Court of Michigan decided the question in 1922, In re Norris
Estate (Stone v. Holden), 191 N. W. 238. On a blank form the testator
had filled in his name at the beginning and in the attestation clause and
published it as his will without actually signing it on the line provided for
that purpose. This will was held to be duly executed since there was an
intention on the part of the testator to adopt his name as written by him
in the beginning of the will or in the attestation clause as his signature.
More recently this decision was reaffirmed in Michigan, when the Supreme
Court held that the superscription, "The will of Augusta M. Thomas" in
testator's own writing was a sufficient signing, no other signature appearing at the end of the will. In re Thomas Estate, 220 N. W. 764.
In the case of Armstrong v. Armstrong, 29 Ala. 538, in which the will
was written by another at the direction of the testator, but was not signed

